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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms often license to direct competitors their
patented innovation (Jiang and Shi, 2018). Investments in either new tech-
nologies or in new product development allow ﬁrms to advance in economic
performance, gaining a competitive advantage via innovation. The literature on
patent licensing considers contracts that assume diﬀerent forms such as either a
ﬁxed-fee or a per-unit/ad valorem royalty, as well as a two-part tariﬀ including
both a ﬁxed fee and a royalty component, generally focusing on the optimality
of a license scheme over the other.1
The present paper investigates, in a framework of product innovation, the
optimal patent licensing by an incumbent when consumers’ preferences exhibit
network eﬀects. Such consumption externalities, which are typical of markets
such as telecommunications, on-line games, digital music/movies, payment sys-
tems, software and e-commerce platforms, imply that the value of a good to a
consumer increases as the number of its users grows. Network eﬀects are argued
to lie behind the success of the most dynamic and impactful companies in the
world such as Microsoft, PayPal. Microsoft, Facebook, Uber, Twitter and Sales-
force. Most recent Industrial Organization literature points out the key role of
network eﬀects in aﬀecting via expectations ﬁrms’ equilibrium network size and
the adoption of innovations, thus achieving a critical mass (David, 1985; Farrell
and Saloner, 1985; Arthur, 1989; Choi, 1994; Economides, 1996a; Cabral et al.,
1999).2 The intensity of network eﬀects has been also shown to impact product
pricing and the strength of ﬁrms’ market power (Cabral, 2011; Katz, Shapiro,
1985 and 1986), the strategic choices of product characteristics (Lambertini and
Orsini, 2001; Baake and Boom, 2001; Garcia and Gabszewicz, 2007) and the
determinants of market structure through ﬁrm entry (Economides, 1996b) and
vertical integration (Dogan, 2009).
Licensing of new products, brands and services has become a crucial revenue
source in network industries. Recent evidence suggests that licensing is a pow-
erful value driver for Nokia, with brand and technology licensing net sales of 1.6
billion Euros in 2017 (Nokia Corporation Financial Report, 2018), and a rev-
enue generator for Microsoft, Ericsson, IBM, Qualcomm and Texas instruments
(Ludlow, 2014). Also, earnings of on-line games’ developers have massively in-
creased over the last years (State of the Developer Nation, 2018). In a lot of
cases licensing occurs between ﬁrms that are direct competitors. See Microsoft
that licensed mobile operating system features to Samsung and HTC (Hoﬀman,
2014) or Apple that obtained from Microsoft an eight-year license for Applesoft
Basic that is a dialect of Microsoft Basic, adapted to the Apple II services of per-
sonal computers. Moreover General Motors (GM) licensed its OnStar service,
1Literature shows that the optimality of licensing schemes depends on whether the patentee
is external to the market (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Muto, 1993; Erutku, and Richelle, 2007)
or rather is a producer within the market (Wang, 1998), on product diﬀerentiation (Kabiraj
and Lee, 2011; Bagchi and Mukherjee, 2014), on whether ﬁrms compete with respect to
quantities or price (Muto, 1993; Bagchi and Mukherjee, 2014).
2See Gandal (2008) for empirical studies emphasizing the role of network eﬀects in boosting
ﬁrm success.
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an in-vehicle satellitebased mapping service, to other automobile manufacturers
as Toyota and Honda.
Despite network eﬀects have received wide attention in recent years both in
practice and academic research, the analysis of their eﬀects on licensing behavior
in oligopolistic markets has been limited to very few studies dealing with the
optimality of licensing strategies in a quantity competition framework. Wang
et al. (2012) introduce network externalities in a Cournot model of process
innovation, showing how they may let the patentee exploit the advantages of a
larger market size achieved by favoring the competitor’s production through a
ﬁxed fee, rather than charge a royalty restricting the licensees’ output. The same
mechanism is at work in the product innovation model of Lin and Kulatilaka
(2006) who demonstrate that a pure ﬁxed-fee license dominates a two-part tariﬀ
when the network intensity is high enough. By contrast, Zhao et al (2014)
ﬁnd that ﬁxed-fee licensing never dominates royalty licensing or two-part tariﬀ
licensing when network eﬀects interact with quality diﬀerences in a vertical
product innovation model.
In the present paper we aim at investigating how the presence of network
eﬀects aﬀects the optimal behavior of an incumbent innovator that licenses a
new product technology to a potential market rival through a two-part tariﬀ.3
Market competition can occur under Cournot or under Bertrand, while either a
per-unit and ad valorem royalty is included in the two-part licensing scheme.4
In particular, we focus on how the strength of network externalities aﬀects the
relative proﬁtability of Cournot vs. Bertrand, for each considered contract.
The comparison on proﬁtability between Cournot and Bertrand competition is
an extensively debated issue in oligopoly theory. Following Singh and Vives
(1984), much literature has found a dominance of Cournot over Bertrand with
substitutes (Tanaka, 2001a; Tanaka, 2001b; Tasnádi, 2000, among others). This
result, however, has been reversed in several circumstances: in mixed duopolies
due to the presence of social welfare maximizing ﬁrms (Ghosh and Mitra, 2010;
Matsumura and Ogawa, 2012), in vertically related industries (Correa-López
and Naylor, 2004; Arya et al. 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2012; Alipranti et al.,
2014), under cost and demand asymmetries (Zanchettin, 2006) and substantial
quality diﬀerences (Häckner, 2000). Recently, it has been raised the question of
whether the Singh and Vives (1984)’s result is robust to the presence of network
eﬀects. In this regard, Pal (2014) has shown that, when network externalities
3Optimal two-part licensing contracts have been studied, among the others, by Kamien
and Tauman (1984), Erutku and Richelle (2007), Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002), Sen and
Tauman (2007), Sen and Stamatopoulos (2009) and Filippini and Vergari (2017).
4 Including a per unit or an ad valorem royalty in a licensing agreement is empirically
observed (Bousquet et al., 1998; Lim and Veugelers, 2003; Trombini and Comacchio, 2012)
and theoretically justiﬁed (San Martín and Saracho, 2010, 2015, 2016; Heywood et al., 2014;
Colombo and Filippini, 2015a and 2015b, Fan et al., 2018). Whether a per-unit or an ad
valorem royalty must be included in a licence is found to depend on the mode of competition
(Colombo and Filippini, 2015a and 2015b), on demand or cost uncertainty (Bousquet et al.,
1998), on product diﬀerentiation and the licensee’ development cost for the new product (San
Martín and Saracho, 2016), on the relative eﬃciency of the licensee compared to the licensor
(Fan et al., 2018), on asymmetric information about the value of the patent (Heywood et al.,
2014).
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are strong enough, the positive eﬀect on proﬁts caused by tougher competition
in Bertrand, which positively impacts on the equilibrium prices via consumers’
expectations, dominates the standard negative eﬀect of tougher competition on
proﬁts, leading to higher proﬁts in Bertrand.5
The debate on Cournot vs. Bertrand proﬁtability has been recently revis-
ited by Chang et al (2017) in a patent licensing game. In this study, a product
innovator charges a ﬁxed fee plus a per unit royalty to either a potential rival
or an incumbent rival. They ﬁnd that the royalty rate under Bertrand compe-
tition works as a commitment of the licensor to set higher market prices, which
enhance licensing revenues and let market proﬁts to be higher under Bertrand
than under Cournot, regardless of the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Our
work extends Chang et al (2017) to the presence of network externalities, show-
ing that market proﬁtability may be reverted in favor of Cournot or Bertrand,
depending on the type of the royalty payment. When a per unit royalty ap-
plies, proﬁts may be either greater or lower under Cournot competition than
under Bertrand competition, depending on the interplay between the intensity
of network eﬀects and the degree of product substitutability. Conversely, when
an ad valorem royalty is included in the two part tariﬀ, Cournot turns out to
be always more proﬁtable than Bertrand in the range of the parameters which
ensures that both the ﬁxed and the variable price are positive. These results
have the following intuitive explanation. Increasing network eﬀects, by rais-
ing end-users’ utility and shifting market demand through expectations, can
enhance one ﬁrm’s ability to both expand its output and exploit higher con-
sumers’ willingness to pay setting higher prices. A contract with a per unit
royalty, however, by restricting the licensee’s output, leads higher network ef-
fects to limit the licensee’s ability to set a higher price in Bertrand, while it
lets higher network eﬀects positively aﬀect, through the channel of expectations
on a larger market size, both the licensee’s output and price in Cournot. As
long as product substitutability is high enough, the positive eﬀect of a higher
royaly rate is still high and dominates the negative eﬀect of network external-
ities on the licensee’price in Bertrand. This allows Bertrand to be still more
proﬁtable than Cournot, as in Chang et al. (2017). However, suﬃciently low
product substitutability, by reducing the negative eﬀect on proﬁts of a limited
licensee’s production in Cournot, yields the reversal result that Cournot is more
proﬁtable than Bertrand, which turns out to occur more likely when network
eﬀects increase. Finally, we provide the following explanation for higher prof-
itability in Cournot relative to Bertrand under ad valorem royalty licensing. In
this case, the patentee’s optimal behavior is aimed to induce both a higher price
and a higher output by the licensee. The latter is therefore able to exploit a
larger network size through expectations both when she acts as a price-setter
and as a quantity-setter, which lets market variables increase in the network
externalities irrespective of the mode of competition. In such circumstances,
the relative proﬁtability between Bertrand and Cournot is determined by the
5The same result has been also achieved by Pal (2015) in a managerial delegation context
with negative network externalities.
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interplay between the positive eﬀect on proﬁts through consumers’ expectations
and the negative eﬀect caused by more aggressive conduct, as in Pal (2014),
which plays in favor of Cournot in the range of the model’s parameters ensuring
the positivity of the contract’s components.
Our results contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, they
point out the role of network externalities in a licensing framework with price
competition, which has been never investigated in previous literature. Second,
the paper captures the implications of network eﬀects on product innovation
licensing, showing how the result of Chang et al. (2017) that Bertrand is
more proﬁtable than Cournot regardless of product substitutability does not
hold when network eﬀects are strong enough and product substitutability is
suﬃciently low. Third, it shows that the Pal (2014)’s conclusion that higher
Bertrand proﬁtability arises when the strength of network eﬀects is high enough
is reversed under the cost asymmetries induced by a contract with a per unit
royalty.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
model, while Section 3 draws some conclusions.
2 The model
Firm 1 is an incumbent producer facing the following linear demand function:6
p1 = a+ ny1 − q1
where a > 0, q1 denotes the quantity produced by the monopolist, p1 its price,
and y1 denotes the consumers’ expectation about ﬁrm 1’s market size (sales),
with n (with 0 ≤ n < 1) measuring the strength of network eﬀect. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that both the variable and the ﬁxed costs production
are zero. Firm 1 has to decide whether to license its product innovation to a
potential rival, ﬁrm 2, thus allowing it to produce a diﬀerentiated network good
with the same technology as ﬁrm 1. In the case of licensing, market structure
becomes a duopoly à la Cournot or à la Bertrand in which the two ﬁrms face
the following inverse demand functions (Hoernig, 2012):
p1 = a+ n (y1 + γy2)− q1 − γq2 (1)
p2 = a+ n (y2 + γy1)− q2 − γq1 (2)
6We assume that prior licensing the patentee produces only a veriety of the good for a
higher marketing or development cost that discourages her to produce an additional variety
(Chang et al., 2017). This is a standard assumption in literature on product innovation
(Kitagawa et al., 2014, San Martin and Saracho, 2016, Kitagawa et al., 2018) that associates
the creation of new varieties with brand name, packaging, after-sales services, and switching
costs (Kitagawa et al., 2014, San Martin and Saracho, 2016, Kitagawa et al., 2018). The same
assumption is also used in literature on process innovation (e.g., Faulì-Oller and Sandonis,
2002; Wang, 2002; Wang and Yang, 1999; Colombo, 2015) in which ﬁrms compete on the
market with imperfect substitute products under a drastic cost-reducing innovation.
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q2 and p2 being respectively ﬁrm 2’s output and price, whereas y2 is consumers’
expectations on ﬁrm 2’s sales. The parameter γ in the range [0, 1] measures
the degree of substitutability between the two varieties (γ = 0 implies that the
products are unrelated, whereas γ = 1 implies that the products are perfect
substitutes).
The direct demand functions can be written as:
q1 =
a(1− γ) + ny1(1− γ2)− p1 + γp2
(1− γ2) (3)
q2 =
a(1− γ) + ny2(1− γ2)− p2 + γp1
(1− γ2) (4)
The game timing is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 chooses to license
its new product technology or not through the payment of a two-part tariﬀ, i.e.
a lump sum payment plus either a per unit or an ad valorem royalty. In the
second stage, if any, ﬁrm 2 accepts the contract oﬀered by the rival and the
two ﬁrms engage in either Cournot or Bertrand market competition. In Section
2.1 we derive the solution in a scenario with no licensing. The latter is then
compared with the market outcome derived under per unit (ad valorem) royalty
licensing in Section 2.2 (Section 2.3), implying a search for the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) either in Cournot or Bertrand.
2.1 The no licensing framework
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 is as follows:
π1 = (a+ ny1 − q1) q1 (5)
By maximizing (5) with respect to q1, we obtain:
q1 =
a+ ny1
2
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Hoernig (2012), we assume that
consumers’ expectations satisfy a rational expectations’ condition, which implies
that in equilibrium y1 = q1, thus obtaining the following output:
q1 =
a
2− n (6)
The equilibrium price is:
p1 =
a
2− n (7)
By substituting (6) and (7) in (5), we obtain ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts:
π1 =
a2
(2− n)2
(8)
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2.2 Two-part tariﬀ licensing with a per unit royalty
We assume that the ﬁrm 1 can license its innovation by imposing the payment
of a royalty r for each unit sold by ﬁrm 2 and a ﬁxed amount F .7 Therefore,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
π1 = p1q1 + (rq2 + F ) (9)
π2 = (p2 − r) q2 − F (10)
2.2.1 Cournot competition
By using the inverse demand functions (1) and (2) and maximizing proﬁts (9)
and (10) with respect to q1 and q1, we obtain the following reaction functions:
q1 =
a+ n(y1 + γy2)− γq2
2
q2 =
a+ n(γy1 + y2)− γq1 − r
2
Notice that each reaction function shifts outward as consumers’ expectations
increase, denoting that one ﬁrm’s output is positively inﬂuenced by expectations
on both its own sales and the rival’s sales. The solution of the system of the
reaction functions, under the rational expectations’ conditions y1 = q1 and
y2 = q2, gives the optimal quantities:
q1 =
a(2− (n+ γ(1− n))) + rγ(1− n)
4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1− n)2) (11)
q2 =
a(2− (n+ γ(1− n)))− r(2− n)
4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1− n)2) (12)
Notice that ∂q1∂r > 0 and
∂q2
∂r < 0, that is, setting a higher r lets ﬁrm 1’s
output increase and ﬁrm 2”s output decrease.
Given the optimal quantities (11) and (12), ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt can be written as
follows:
7This model has also been performed under the assumption of ﬁxed fee licensing, i.e.
introducing network externalities in Section 2.1 of Chapter 1. We observe that the non
proﬁtability of ﬁxed fee licensing with respect to no licensing is less likely to occur for increasing
network externalities. By shifting market demand, network eﬀects allow the patentee to exploit
the higher consumers’ willingness to pay, thus beneﬁting from its own market proﬁts and more
consistent licensing revenues. This leads licensing to be advantageous for a higher extent of
the product diﬀerentiated parameter. Consistently with the results obtained by Wang et
al. (2012) and Lin and Kulatilaka (2006) respectively in a Cournot framework with process
innovation and in a Cournot framework with product innovation, we show that suﬃciently
intense network eﬀects make licensing advantageous in Cournot also when products are close
substitutes. Moreover, by comparing the patentee’s proﬁt in Cournot and Bertrand, we show
that strong enough network externalities lead Bertrand to be more proﬁtable than Cournot.
Intuitions are provided by Pal (2014) who ﬁnds the same result in a non-licensing model.
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π2 =
(a(2− (n+ γ(1− n)))− r(2− n))2
(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1− n)2))2
− F
Being ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts under no licensing equal to zero, the maximum F that
the licensee accepts to pay is:
F =
(a(2− (n+ γ(1− n)))− r(2− n))2
(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1− n)2))2
(13)
Notice that ∂F∂r < 0.
At the royalty setting stage, maximization of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt in (9), calculated
at the optimal quantities, gives the equilibrium royalty rate:
rC =
a(2− (γ + n(1− γ)))2(γ(1− n)− n)
2(4− (γ2(3− n3 + 5n2 − 7n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n))) (14)
By substituting (14) in (13), we obtain the equilibrium ﬁxed fee:
FCU =
a2(4− n(4− n)− γ(4 + n2 − 5n))2
4 (4− (γ2(3− n3 + 5n2 − 7n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n)))2
Notice that both F and r are positive in the area above the green curve in
Figure 1.
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We now calculate the market variables at the SPNE, i.e. the equilibrium
quantities and prices:
qCU1 =
a((2− γ)(2− n)− γ2(1− n))
2(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(3 + n2 − 4n)))
qCU2 =
a((4 + n2)(1− γ)− n(4− 5γ))
2(4− (γ2(3− n3 + 5n2 − 7n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n)))
pCU1 =
a((2− γ)(2− n)− γ2(1− n))
2(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(3 + n2 − 4n)))
pCU2 =
a((2− n)2 + γ(1− n)(n+ γ2(1− n))− γ2(4 + n2 − 5n))
2(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(3 + n2 − 4n)))
Firm 1’s proﬁts are as follows at the SPNE:
πCU1 =
a2(8 + γ2(1− n)2 − 2γ(4 + n2 − 5n)− n(8− n))
4(4− (γ2(3− n3 + 5n2 − 7n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n))) (15)
while πCU2 = 0. It is worth noting that all market variables increase in n:
indeed,
∂pCU
1
∂n > 0,
∂pCU
2
∂n > 0,
∂qCU
1
∂n > 0,
∂qCU
2
∂n > 0. Moreover, while the royalty
rate decreases in n, the ﬁxed fee increases in n. Finally, we ﬁnd that network
eﬀects impacts positively on ﬁrm 1 proﬁts, i.e., ∂πCU1∂n > 0.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under licensing in (15) are higher
than ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under no licensing in (8) in the region of the parameters
which ensure positivity of the market variables and the licensing contract com-
ponents. This is stated in the following remark.
Remark 1 By assuming quantity competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with
a per unit royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder when γ ≥ n1−n with
0 ≤ n ≤ 12 (i.e. above the green curve in Figure 1) where market variables and
licensing contract components are positive.
2.2.2 Bertrand competition
By engaging in Bertrand competition, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 face the direct demand
functions (3) and (4) and maximize their own proﬁts in (9) and (10) with respect
to p1 and p2, respectively. The following reaction functions are then obtained:
p1 =
a(1− γ) + ny1(1− γ2) + γ(p2 + r)
2
p2 =
a(1− γ) + ny2(1− γ2) + γp1 + r
2
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By solving the system of the above reaction functions, under the conditions
y1 =
a(1−γ)−p1+γp2
(1−γ2)(1−n) and y2 =
a(1−γ)−p2+γp1
(1−γ2)(1−n) , we obtain the following prices:
p1 =
a(2− (n(1− γ) + γ(1 + γ))) + rγ(3− 4n+ n2)
4− (n(4− n) + γ2) (16)
p2 =
a(2− (n(1− γ) + γ(1 + γ))) + r(2− (n(3− n)− γ2(1− n)))
4− (n(4− n) + γ2) (17)
Observe that ∂p1∂r > 0 and
∂p2
∂r > 0, which implies that setting a higher r
leads both ﬁrms to charge higher prices.
Fimr 2’s proﬁt can be written as follows:
π2 = (a(2−(γ(1+γ)+n(1−γ)))−r(2−n)(1−γ
2))(a(2+γ−n)−r(2−n)(1+γ))
(1+γ)((4−γ2)−n(4−n))2 − F
The maximum F that the licensee accepts to pay for the innovation is there-
fore:
F = (a(2−(γ(1+γ)+n(1−γ)))−r(2−n)(1−γ
2))(a(2+γ−n)−r(2−n)(1+γ))
(1+γ)((4−γ2)−n(4−n))2 (18)
Maximization of ﬁrm 1’ proﬁt in (9), after incorporating (18) and the optimal
prices in (16) and (17), leads to the optimal royalty rate:
rB =
a (2− n+ γ)2 (γ − n)
2(4− (n(8 + n2 − 5n)− γ2(5 + 2n2 − 7n))) (19)
The ﬁxed fee is then obtained by substituting (19) in (18):
FBU =
a2(4−γ3(2−n)+γ2(2+n2−4n)−γ(4+2n2−7n)−n(4−n))(4+γ2(2−n)+nγ(3−n)−n(4−n))
4(1+γ)(4−(n(8+n2−5n)−γ2(5+2n2−7n)))2
It is easy to check that both the variable royalty and the ﬁxed fee are positive
in the region of parameters above the brown curve in Figure 1
The market variables at the SPNE, i.e., prices and quantities, are:
pBU1 =
a(4 + γ2(7− 3n)− γ(2− n2 + n)− 2n)
2(4− (n(4− n)− γ2(5− 2n)))
pBU2 =
a(4− γ3 + γ2(6− n)− n(4− n+ γ))
2(4− (n(4− n)− γ2(5− 2n)))
qBU1 =
a

4 + γ3 + γ2(5− 3n) + γ(2− n)− 2n(3− n)

2 (1− n) (1 + γ) (4− (n(4− n)− γ2(5− 2n)))
qBU2 =
a

4 + γ2(2− n) + γn(3− n)− n(4− n)

2 (1− n) (1 + γ) (4− (n(4− n)− γ2(5− 2n)))
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Firm 1’s proﬁts at the SPNE are:
πBU1 =
a2

8 + γ3 + 3γ2(3− 2n) + γn(2 + n)− n(8− n)

4 (1− n) (1 + γ) (4− (n(4− n)− γ2(5− 2n))) (20)
while πBU2 = 0. When n increases, we ﬁnd that ∂p
BU
1
∂n > 0 and
∂qBU
1
∂n > 0, as
far as ﬁrm 1 is concerned, while ∂p
BU
2
∂n < 0 and
∂qBU
2
∂n > 0 as regards ﬁrm 2. Also
notice that the variable royalty r and the ﬁxed fee FBU respectively decreases
and increases in n. Finally, network eﬀects turn out to positively impact on
ﬁrm 1 proﬁts, i.e.,
∂πBU
1
∂n > 0.
Comparing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under licensing in (20) and its proﬁts under no
licensing in (8) allows us to introduce the following remark.
Remark 2 By assuming price competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with
a per unit royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder when γ ≥ n with
0 ≤ n < 1 (i.e. above the brown curve in Figure 1) where market variables and
licensing contract componets are positive.
2.2.3 Cournot vs. Bertrand under a per unit royalty
Here we compare the patentee’s proﬁts under Cournot and Bertrand compe-
tition. The red curve in Figure 1 represents the proﬁt diﬀerential πCU1 − πBU1
which turns out to be positive below the curve, while it is negative above. By fo-
cusing on the region of the parameters in which all market variables are positive
and licensing is advantageous for the patentee both in Cournot and Bertrand,
that is the area above the green curve, it is easy to check that rB > rC , while
πCU1 − πBU1 may be positive or negative, according to the interplay between n
and γ.
Proposition 1 follows from the above analysis.
Proposition 1 Under two-part tariﬀ licensing with a per unit royalty, mar-
ket proﬁtability is higher under Bertrand than under Cournot, regardless of γ
when n = 0 (Chang et al, 2017), and at suﬃciently high values of γ for any
given 0 < n ≤ 1. Increasing network eﬀects make the Bertrand proﬁts less likely
to dominate the Cournot proﬁts.
oppure
Proposition 1 Under two-part tariﬀ licensing with a per unit royalty, for a
given n, market proﬁtability is higher under Bertrand than under Cournot above
a γ limit, while the opposite occurs below the γ limit in our region of interest
γ ≥ n1−n with 0 ≤ n ≤ 0.5 (i.e above the green curve of Figure 1). When
n = 0 the patentee is better oﬀ under Bertrand competition, regardless of γ.
Increasing network eﬀects make the Bertrand proﬁts less likely to dominate the
Cournot proﬁts.
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Proposition 1 Under two-part tariﬀ licensing with a per unit royalty, there
always exists γ in the region of parameters where licensing is proﬁtable and the
contractual terms are positive, that is when γ ≥ n1−n (see Remark 1), such that
market proﬁtability under Bertrand is higher (lower) than under Cournot for
γ ≥ γ ( γ < γ), for any given n ∈

0, 12

. Since ∂γ∂n > 0, increasing network
eﬀects make the Bertrand proﬁts less likely to dominate the Cournot proﬁts.
Proof:
From (20) and (19), we obtain:
πBU1 −πCU1 =
γ(1−γ)((1−n)(2−n)2γ3−n(1−n)(8−3n)γ2−n(2−n)(2+n2−4n)γ+n2(2−n)2)
2(1−n)(4+n2−γ2n2+4γ2n−4n−3γ2)(4−4n+n2+5γ2−2γ2n)(1+γ)
We get that:
sign

γ(1−γ)((1−n)(2−n)2γ3−n(1−n)(8−3n)γ2−n(2−n)(2+n2−4n)γ+n2(2−n)2)
2(1−n)(4+n2−γ2n2+4γ2n−4n−3γ2)(4−4n+n2+5γ2−2γ2n)(1+γ)

=
= sign [f (γ, n)]
where f (γ, n) = (1− n) (2− n)2 γ3−n (1− n) (8− 3n) γ2−n (2− n)

2 + n2 − 4n

γ+
n2 (2− n)2. For any given n ∈

0, 12

, there exists a γ, say γ, such that
f (γ, n) ≥ 0 if γ ≥ γ (f (γ, n) < 0 if γ < γ).
An explanation of Proposition 1 is as follows. When n = 0 (Chang et al,
2017), Bertrand competition is more proﬁtable than Cournot due to the higher
royalty rate in Bertrand which is optimally chosen to keep prices relatively high,
thus raising market proﬁtability. In Bertrand, however, more intense network
eﬀects on the one hand induce a price increase by both ﬁrms through expecta-
tions on a larger network size, on the other hand weaken the patentee’s incentive
to keep prices high through a high royalty rate. Due to the output contraction
induced by the royalty payment, the second negative eﬀect on the licensee’s
price dominates the ﬁrst positive eﬀect, leading its price to decrease when n
increases. For the patentee, instead, the positive eﬀect through market size ex-
pectations always dominates the negative eﬀect of a lower royalty rate, which
lets its price increase in n. The weaker position of the licensee ﬁrm, instead,
does not refrain it from enjoying a larger expected market size and expand-
ing both its output and price following an increase of network eﬀects. The
same occurs for the patentee. Finally, it can be observed that suﬃciently high
product substitutability in Bertrand, by enhancing the patentee’s incentive to
set a relatively high royalty rate and soften tougher market competition, limits
the negative impact of network eﬀects on the licensee’s price, thus improving
Bertrand proﬁtability relative to Cournot. Conversely, suﬃciently low product
substitutability, by reducing the licensee’s loss associated with its weaker po-
sition under increasing network eﬀects, pushes towards higher proﬁtability of
Cournot than Bertrand.8
8This contrasts with Pal (2014) where strong enough network externalities lead the indirect
positive eﬀect of Bertrand more aggressive conduct on proﬁts to dominate the direct (standard)
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2.3 Two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad valorem royalty
In this section we keep the above assumptions on demand and ﬁrms’ costs.
Moreover, we assume that ﬁrm 1 uses a two-part tariﬀ including a royalty d
which is a fraction of rival’s revenues and a ﬁxed amount F . We can write ﬁrm
1’s and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts as follows:
π1 = p1q1 + dp2q2 + F (21)
π2 = (1− d) p2q2 − F (22)
2.3.1 Cournot competition
At the market stage, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 compete à la Cournot facing the inverse
demand function respectively in (1) and in (2). Maximization of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts
in (21) with respect to q1 and maximization of ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts in (22) with
respect to q2 lead to:
q1 =
a+ n(y1 + γy2)− γq2(1 + d)
2
q2 =
a+ n(γy1 + y2)− γq1
2
The above reaction functions yield, under the rational expectations’s condi-
tions (y1 = q1 and y2 = q2), the optimal quantities:
q1 =
a (2− n(1− γ)− γ(1 + d))
4− (γ2((1− n)2 + d(1− n)) + n(4− n)) (23)
q2 =
a(2− (n+ γ(1− n)))
4− (γ2((1− n)2 + d(1− n)) + n(4− n)) (24)
Subject to (23) and (24), the licensee’s proﬁt is:
π2 =
a2 (1− d) (2− (n+ γ(1− n)))2
(4− (γ2((1− n)2 + d(1− n)) + n(4− n)))2
− F
Under the constraint (1− d) p2q2 − F ≥ 0, which deﬁnes the maximum
amount F that the licensee pays for the innovation, i.e.
F =
a2 (1− d) (2− (n+ γ(1− n)))2
(4− (γ2((1− n)2 + d(1− n)) + n(4− n)))2
the patentee maximizes her own proﬁt with respect to d, thus setting:
negative eﬀect, which leads Bertrand to be more proﬁtable than Cournot. In our case, by
contrast, suﬃciently intense network eﬀects always enhance market proﬁtability in Cournot,
while they negatively aﬀect the Bertrand proﬁts by limiting, through a royalty rate reduction,
the licensee’s ability to exploit higher consumers’ willingness to pay.
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dC = γ
3(1−n3+3n2−3n)−γ2(4−n3+6n2−9n)+γ(4+n3−n2−4n)−n(2−n)2
(4−γ2(1−n)2−γ(2+n2−3n)−2n(3−n))γ (25)
The equilibrium ﬁxed fee is as follows:
FCV =
a2(γ2(2−n3+5n2−6n)−γ3(2−n3+4n2−5n)−nγ(2+n2−3n)+n(2−n)2)(4−γ2(1−n)−γ(2−n)−2n)
4(4−γ2(3−n3+5n2−7n)−n(8+n2−5n))(4−γ2(3+n2−4n)−n(4−n))γ
The market variables, i.e., quantities and prices, at the SPNE are:
qCV1 =
a

4− (γ(4 + n2 − 5n) + n(4− n))

2 (4− (γ2(3− n3 + 5n2 − 7n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n)))
qCV2 =
a

4− γ2(1− n)− γ(2− n)− 2n

2 (4− (γ2(3 + n2 − 4n) + n(4− n)))
pCV1 =
a(4 + γ3(1− n)2 − γ2(4 + n2 − 5n) + γn(1− n)− n(4− n))
2 (4− γ2(3 + n2 − 4n)− n(4− n))
pCV2 =
a

4− γ2(1− n)− γ(2− n)− 2n

2 (4− γ2(3 + n2 − 4n)− n(4− n))
Firm 1’s equilibrium proﬁts are:
πCV1 =
a2(8 + γ2(1− n)2 − 2γ(4 + n2 − 5n)− n(8− n))
4 (4− (γ2(3− n3 + 5n2 − 7n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n))) (26)
while πCV2 = 0.
It can be easily checked that both the royalty rate dC and the ﬁxed fee FCV
are positive in the region above the green curve of Figure 2, with dC decreasing
in n and FCV increasing in n. In the same region, all market variables are
positive and increase in n (i.e.,
∂pCV
1
∂n > 0,
∂qCV
1
∂n > 0,
∂pCV
2
∂n > 0 and
∂qCV
2
∂n > 0),
as well as ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts (i.e, ∂π
CV
1
∂n > 0).
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Comparing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under licensing in (26) with ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under
no licensing in (8), we get the result highlighted in the following remark.
Remark 3 Under quantity competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad
valorem royalty is always proﬁtable for the patent holder when γ ≥ n1−n with
0 ≤ n ≤ 0.5 (i.e. above the green curve in Figure 2) where market variables and
licensing contract componets are positive.
Remarkably, by comparing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under ad valorem licensing with
proﬁts under per unit licensing, we ﬁnd that the presence of network externalities
doesn’t aﬀect the Niu (2013)’s result, thus observing that:9
Proposition 2 The patentee is indiﬀerent between licensing through a per
unit royalty or an ad valorem royalty
Proof:
It follows from the identity between (15) and (26).
9See Niu (2013, p. 13) for an intuition of the above equivalence result.
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2.3.2 Bertrand competition
Firm 1 and ﬁrm 2 compete with respect to prices facing the direct demand
functions. Maximizing ﬁrm 1’s and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts with respect to p1 and p2,
respectively, we obtain the following reaction functions:
p1 =
a(1− γ) + ny1(1− γ2) + γp2(1 + d)
2
p2 =
a(1− γ) + ny2(1− γ2) + γp1
2
We solve the above system under the rational expectation conditions y1 =
a(1−γ)−p1+γp2
(1−γ2)(1−n) and y2 =
a(1−γ)−p2+γp1
(1−γ2)(1−n) , getting the optimal prices:
p1 =
a(2− γ2(1 + d(1− n))− n− γ(1− d(1− n)− n))
4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1 + d(1− n))) (27)
p2 =
a(2− γ2 − γ(1− n)− n)
4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1 + d(1− n))) (28)
At the previous stage, subject to (27) and (28), the licensee’s proﬁt can be
written as follows:
π2 =
a2 (1− d) (2− n+ γ)

2− γ2 − γ(1− n)− n

(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1 + d(1− n))))2 (1 + γ)
− F
Under the condition (1− d) p2q2−F ≥ 0, where F represents the maximum
amount the licensee is willing to pay for the new product technology
F =
a2 (1− d) (2− n+ γ)

2− γ2 − γ(1− n)− n

(4− (n(4− n) + γ2(1 + d(1− n))))2 (1 + γ)
(29)
the patentee maximizes her own proﬁt, thus setting the following royalty
rate:
dB =
γ3 + γ2(4− 3n) + γ(4− n(8− 3n))− n(2− n)2
(4− γ2(1− n) + γ(2 + n2 − 3n)− 2n(3− n)) γ (30)
By substituting (30) in (29), we obtain:
FBV =
a2(1−γ)(4−γ2+γ(2−n)−2n))(n(2−n)2−γ3(2−n)−γ2(2−n2)+nγ(2−n))
4(1+γ)(4−γ2(3−2n)−n(4−n))(4−γ2(3+2n2−5n)−n(8+n2−5n))γ
Notice that, at equilibrium, the royalty rate d is positive above the brown
curve in Figure 2, while F is positive below the blue curve.
Firms’ quantities and prices at the SPNE are:
pBV1 =
a(4− γ2(4− 3n) + nγ(1− n)− n(4− n))
2 (4− (γ2(3− 2n) + n(4− n)))
pBV2 =
a(4− γ2 + γ(2− n)− 2n) (1− γ)
2(4− (γ2(3− 2n) + n(4− n)))
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qBV1 =
a(4− γ3 − γ2(4− 3n)− n(4− γ − n))
2 (4− (γ2(3 + 2n2 − 5n) + n(8 + n2 − 5n))) (γ + 1)
qBV2 =
a(4− 2n− γ2 + γ(2− n))
2 (4− (γ2(3− 2n) + n(4− n))) (γ + 1)
with the patentee’s quantity being positive below the pink curve in Figure 2.
This implies that both d and F are positive in the region of parameters included
between the blue curve and the brown curve, where all market variables are also
positive.
Firm 1’s proﬁts at the SPNE are:
πBV1 =
a2(8− γ3 − γ2(7− 6n) + nγ(2− n)− n(8− n))
4 (4− γ2(3 + 2n2 − 5n)− n(8 + n2 − 5n)) (γ + 1) (31)
while πBV2 = 0.
As in the previous settings, we ﬁnd that the royalty rate and the ﬁxed fee
respectively decreases and increases in n. Likewise, all market variables and
ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts positively depend on n.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that proﬁts under licensing in (31) are larger than ﬁrm
1’s proﬁts under no licensing in (8) below the black curve in Figure 2. We can
conclude that licensing is always proﬁtable in the region of the parameters in
which both the ﬁxed fee, the royalty rate and all market variables are positive,
then getting the result included in the following remark
Remark 4 Under price competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad
valorem royalty is proﬁtable for the patent holder in the relevant region of the
parameter space.
oppure
Remark 4 Under price competition, two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad
valorem royalty is proﬁtable for the patent holder when n ≤ γ ≤ ( 13(−2+n)(2 +
3
s
A+ 3B(2− n)2 + C
3
√
A+3B(2−n)2
− n2)) (i.e. the area between the blue curve
and the brown curve in Figure 2) with 0 ≤ n < 1
A = 8− n6 − 18n5 + 132n4 − 333n3 + 384n2 − 180n
B = (
√
3
s
n (n6 + 11n5 − 79n4 + 176n3 − 172n2 + 71n− 8))
C = (4 + n4 + 3n3 − 16n2 + 12n)
where market variables and licensing contract components are positive.
Moreover, by comparing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under ad valorem licensing in (31)
with proﬁts under per unit licensing in (20), we ﬁnd that the presence of network
externalities doesn’t aﬀect the Colombo and Filippini (2015b)’s result, thus
observing that:10
10See Colombo and Filippini (2015b, p. 9) for an intuition of the above result.
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Proposition 3 Under Bertrand competition, patent licensing is more prof-
itable when the contract includes a per unit royalty in a two-part tariﬀ than an
ad valorem royalty.
Proof:
πU1 − πV1 = a
2γ(2+γ−n)2(n−γ)2
2(1−n)(1+γ)(n2+2γ2n−4n−3γ2+4)(4−4n+n2+5γ2−2γ2n) > 0
2.3.3 Cournot vs. Bertrand under an ad valorem royalty
Let us compare the patentee’s proﬁts under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
The red curve in Figure 2 represents the proﬁt diﬀerential πC1 − πB1 which is
positive above the curve, while it is negative below. By focusing on the region
of the parameters in which all market variables are positive and licensing is
advantageous in both Cournot and Bertrand, that is that included between the
blue and the green curve, we ﬁnd that dB > dC and πC1 − πB1 > 0.
The following proposition then holds.
Proposition 4 Licensing a new product technology to a potential rival using
a two-part contract with ad valorem royalty is more proﬁtable under Cournot
competition than under Bertrand competition, regardless of the degree of product
substitutability and the intensity of network eﬀects.
oppure
Proposition 4 Under two-part tariﬀ licensing with an ad valorem royalty,
regardless of the degree of product substitutability and the intensity of network
eﬀects market proﬁtability is higher under Cournot than under Bertrand in the
region n1−n ≤ γ ≤ ( 13(−2+n)( 3
s
A+ 3B(2− n)2 + C
3
√
A+3B(2−n)2
+ 2− n2)) with
0 ≤ n ≤ 12 (i.e. the area between the blue curve and the green curve in Figure
2) and
A = 8− n6 − 18n5 + 132n4 − 333n3 + 384n2 − 180n
B =
√
3
s
n (n6 + 11n5 − 79n4 + 176n3 − 172n2 + 71n− 8)
C = 4 + n4 + 3n3 − 16n2 + 12n
Proof:
From (26) and (31), we get πCV1 − πBV1 =?????? ≥ 0⇒ n ≤ n
where n =
4−3γ3−4γ2+4γ−
√
16−32γ2−3γ6+20γ4
2(2−γ3−2γ2+γ) . Since the condition n ≤ hn
(with hn = γ1+γ ) deﬁnes the region of the parameters ensuring proﬁtability of
licensing and positivity of the contractual terms (see Remark 4) and should be
met and, moreover, since n ≤ hn, we can conclude that the Cournot proﬁts are
always higher than the Bertrand proﬁts.
Clearly, unlike the case of per unit royalty, market proﬁtability is no more
aﬀected by product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of network eﬀects in the
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region of parameters ensuring that both the ﬁxed fee and the royalty rate are
positive, namely when n is not too high for any given γ. Indeed, we observed
that a per unit royalty, by causing an output contraction by the licensee, limits
the positive eﬀect of higher network externalities on both its price and output,
with an extent that depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation and deter-
mines higher proﬁtability of either Cournot or Bertrand. By contrast, we ﬁnd
that a change of an ad valorem royalty rate does not aﬀect directly the licensee’s
choices, which are distorted only through the patentee’s behavior. The latter
is then oriented to induce, through an appropriate choice of the ad valorem
royalty, both a quantity and a price increase by the licensee,11 which are fur-
ther enhanced by increasing network eﬀects under both Bertrand and Cournot.
Under low enough network eﬀects, which are required for positivity of both the
ﬁxed fee and the royalty rate, the negative direct eﬀect of ﬁrms’ more aggressive
play in Bertrand relative to Cournot turns out dominate its positive indirect ef-
fect via expectations, leading to more proﬁtable Cournot competition regardless
of the degree of product diﬀerentiation and the strength of network eﬀects.12
3 Concluding remarks
This paper has reconsidered the relative proﬁtability of Cournot vs. Bertrand
competition in a network market in which a patent holder licenses, through a
two-part tariﬀ, her product innovation to a potential rival.13 We have found
that the interplay between the intensity of network eﬀects and the degree of
product diﬀerentiation diﬀerently aﬀect relative market proﬁtability in Cournot
and Bertrand under a per unit royalty. This result is driven by per unit royalties
which reduces the licensee ﬁrm’s output and, under increasing network eﬀects,
refrain it from fully exploiting the higher consumers’ willingness to pay to set
a higher price in Bertrand and exploit the higher network size in Cournot.
The intensity of network eﬀects has been shown to interact with the degree of
product diﬀerentiation, determining the extent of the above eﬀects and their
impact on the licensing revenues in the two competition frameworks, causing
either a dominance of Cournot or a dominance of Bertrand proﬁts. Conversely,
under ad valorem two-part licensing, the patentee’s strategic incentive to behave
less aggressively and favor the rival to some extent, does not limit the licensee
from enjoying the beneﬁts induced by a larger equilibrium network size, both
in Cournot and Bertrand. The standard dominance of Cournot proﬁts over
11See in this regard Colombo and Filippini, 2015b, p. 9.
12The result resembles that achieved under low enough network externalities by Pal (2014)
in a standard duopoly.
13We have also studied the patentee’s proﬁtability on the assumption of licensing one of
her varieties produced in the ex-ante monopolistic framework. In the per-unit royalty case,
we observe that the absence of a ’variety eﬀect’ negatively impacts on the proﬁtability of
licensing vs. no licensing to a lesser extent in Bertrand than in Cournot. This leads the
competition eﬀect to interact with the network externalities making the dominance of Cournot
over Bertrand proﬁts more likely than one variety oﬀered prior to licensing. When an ad
valorem royalty is adopted, the conclusion that Cournot is more proﬁtable than Bertrand
under less likely licensing is then straightforward.
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Bertrand then arises in the relevant range of the model’s parameters, regardless
of the degree of product substitutability and the strength of network eﬀects.14
Our ﬁndings can provide interesting insights on proﬁtability conditions in
network markets which may give rise to antitrust concern. We leave to fu-
ture research the analysis of social desirability of our ﬁndings, as well as their
robustness to the assumption that either the licensee is also an incumbent in
the market or the patentee endogenously chooses her R&D (quality improving)
investment level.
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